Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Dennis Jenkins v. La Wanna Newman : Brief of
Defendant-Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Felton; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant;
William Parsons; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Jenkins v. Newman, No. 18138 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2784

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Ne.WM AN

APR 2 Z 1982
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN 'l'HE SUPREME COURr OF 'IHE STA'IE OF U'mfI

-------·--------·..__________________

~_,_--_._._._

DENNIS JZNKINS,

_________________________________________
**
**
**

Plaintiff-Appellant,

**
**
**
**

vs.
IA WANNA NE'WMAN aka
IA WANNA OLIVER,

case

No. 18138

**

**

Defendant-Respondent,

**

--------------------------------------------------------------------BRIEF

OF'D~-RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE

JUDGMENT

OF 'IHE THIRD

JUDICIAL DISTRICT CDURT OF SALT I.AKE COUNTY, U'mH
'lBE HONORABLE BRYANT H. CRJFr

WILLI.AM B. PARSCNS, III

Attomey for Defendant-Respondent
536 E. 400 S.
Salt lake City, Utah 84102

ROBERT FEL'Irn
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
44 Exchange Place
Salt Iake City, Utah 84111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN 'IHE SUP!ID1E COURr OF 'IHE STA'IE OF UTAH

-.-...-~---------~---------------~--------------------------------~-~----~------~-~-----·

DENNIS JENKINS,

**
**
**
**
**
**

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IA WANNA NEWMAN aka
IA WANNA OLIVER,

Case No. 18138

**

**

**

~fendant-ResJ;Ondent,

**

------------------~-----~-----~~-------~--------------------~--------~----------------

BRIEF OF DEFENmNT-RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM 'lliE JUDGMENT OF
~ICIAL

'!HE

THIRD

DISTRICT <DURT OF SALT !AKE CCUNTY, UTAH
THE HCNOPABLE BRYANT H. CIDFI'

_______________ .., ___ __,...,..., ________

~-=----,...-imEl

______

c-~-----------,_-------.-,--------------

WILLIAM B. Pl\RSCNS, III
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
536 E. 400 S.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
ROBERT FEI.n:rn

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
44 Exchange Place
Salt rake City, Utah 84111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
S'm.TEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
CASE

rn

REI.TEP SOUGHT ON APPEAL

•

DISPOSITICN OF

'!HE

STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT

•

1

THE IDWER COURI'

1-2
2-3
3-4

•

4-10

•

WHERE PIAINTIFP- IS AWARDED SPEX:IFIC
PERroRMANCE FOR THE SALE OF REALTY
HE IS ENTITLED '10 DAMAGES ~ 'ID 'IHE
FAIR RENTAL VALUE FRCM '!HE DATE
POSSESSION SHOOID HAVE PASSED •

CCNCLUSION

•

4-5

10
11

CERTIFICATE

(i)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AU'IHORITIFS CITED

cases

Page

Mayer v.
~Neill

Mayer, 492 P. 2nd 942 (Kansas 1972) •

v.

Reese v.

Allen, 534 P. 2nd 813 (Colorado 1975).

8
•

Geiennann, 574 P. 2nd 445 (Alaska 1978}.

8
8

v. Small Claims Court of Murray City,
590 P. 2nd 309, (Utah 1979).

8

Nutall v.

9

Hurre

HoJ.nian, 173 P. 2nd 1015.

(ii)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN '!HE SUPREME COOR!' OF THE &TATE OF OTAH

**

DENNIS JENKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

**

vs.

**

LA WANNA NEWMAN aka

**

IA WANNA OLIVER,

Defendant-Respondent

case No. 18138

**
**

BRIEF - QP--DEFENPAm'=RESPONPENl'

STATEMENr OF THE NATORE OF THE CASE.

This is an action wherein the Appellant seeks to review the decision of
Judge Croft, the trial Judge in the Third Judicial District Court, who heard
the above-entitled matter at the time of its trial on the merits. Judge
Croft in that action failed to award the Plaintiff-Appellant damages for the
fair rental value of the residence between the time established for the sale
pursuant to the contract and the actual closing date on a judgment which
porports to require specific performance of the contract but in fact allows
the Plaintiff-Appellant significant modification as to their requiranents for
the payment of the IXJrchase price for the property.

DISPOSITION IN THE LaIBR COORI'

The lower court entered a judgment follCMing a hearing on the merits
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which judgment required the Defendant-Respondent to sell to the
Plaintiff-Appellant the real property which was the subject matter of the
litigation subject to the terms and conditions contained in the earnest money
receipt and offer to purchase which had been executed by the respective
parties except for the specific provision contained in the earnest money
receipt and off er to purchase requiring the Plaintiff-Appellant to pay the
canplete balance in the form of a balloon payment of the second trust deed
and note which was used and referenced in the earnest money receipt and offer
to purchase to secure over 3/4 of the total purchase price and more than 3/4
of the total equity of the Defendant-Respondent's interest in the property.
Specifically the earnest money receipt and offer to purchase simply required
the purchaser to pay approximately a $32,000.00 balance on a _$41,000.00 total
purchase price to the Seller in May of 1982. During the course of the
hearing on the merits, Judge Croft received testimony pertaining to the
equity of requiring and not requiring this payment in a timely fonn and chose
in the lower court to not require strict adherence to the time constraints

provided in the contract and further chose not to require the Seller, who is
the Defendant-Respondent in this action, to pay to the Plaintiff-Appellant
any damages for the loss of rents during the pendency of this action or until
the time of the closing of the transaction.

RELIEF SOOGHT ON APPEAL

The Appellant seeks to obtain damages for the fair rental value of the
property without redressing the Seller, who is the Defendant-Respondent in
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this action, for the loss sustained by the Respondent as a result of not
having the use and benefit of the monies that will becane due her in May of
1982 according to a strict reading and interrpretation of the contract terms
and conditions.

The Appellant further asserts an entitlement to attorney's

fees and the Respondent on appeal seeks to avoid the payment of additional
attorney's fees and avoid the further review of the decision and judgment of
the trial court and more particularly the setting aside of the trial courts
decision to prohibit damages for the fair rental value of the property,
accruing f ran the date of the contracts anticipated closing until the date of
the contracts actual closing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Respondent through the use of a realtor in Salt Lake City, Utah,
listed the bane at 1218 Talisman Drive, salt Lake City, Utah, for sale in
early of 1980 and thereafter received an earnest money receipt and offer to
purchase through another realtors off ice for the purchase of the subject
property.
Following additional negotiations an earnest money receipt and offer to
purchase was executed by the Respondent and Appellant as seller and purchaser
respectively.

"As the Appellant asserts on page 3, paragraph 2, of their

brief, the sale agreement provided for what is known as a "balloon paymentn,
on or before May 31, 1982, or if the Appellant sold the hane whichever should
first occur, the balloon payment would be due at the time of the sale thereof.
Pursuant to the Appellant's motion to amend the judgment, Judge Croft amended
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the original judgment on November 3, 1981, again as the Appellant alleges in
their brief, not requiring the payment of that balloon payment until two (2)
years after the sale was canpleted which was and is not strictly and inherence
to the existing terms and conditions of the contract between the parties.
Judge Croft as the time of this detennination to delay the responsibility of
the balloon payment of $32,000.00 on a $41,000.00 sale representing almost
all of the sellers equity of the property, again chose not to require of the
seller, who is the Defendant-Respondent the requirement of the payment of the
rental value of the premises.

Judge Croft did not award the Appellant his

damages for the rental value of the premises during the time the Respondent
refused to canplete the sale believing that it was inappropriate to extend
the time for the "balloon payment" and award rental damages as is referenced
on paragraph 3 of Appellant's brief and is shown on page 64 of the court
record.

All the while, the Appellant is contending that they are entitled to

specific performance under the contract while seeking to avoid adhearing to
their obligations and seeking to enforce specific perf orrnance against the
Defendant-Respondent and avoid the requirements of specific performance for
the Plaintiff-Appellant.
AfGJMEm'

POIN!'

1

THE PLAINl'IFF-APPELLANI' IS

NCJl'

ENI'ITLID 'ID

DAM!-(;E:S EJJUAL 'ID 'IBE FAIR RENTAL VALUE FROM
THE DATE POSSFBSION SHOOLD HAVE PASSED UNl'IL

THE TIME OF ACTUAL CLOSnt; ON 'l'BE BASIS '!HAT
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STRICT SPECIFIC PERFORMAOCE WM ~ RFlJUIRED
FOR '!HE SALE OF THE RFAL PROPERIY IN QUFSI'ION
AND FURTHER ON THE BASIS '!HAT IT WAS WITHIN

THE DISCRE'l'IONARY ADTHORITY OF THE TRIAL
CCX1RI' 'ID DETERMINE THE NA'IURE AND CONl'ENI' OF

THE JUDGMENr AND THE APPROPRIATNESS OF
DAMAGES.

Disecting point 1 into its logic two sub parts an hereinbef ore
enumerated, the Resix>ndent argues that the granting of damages for the rental
value of real property awarded in specific performance cases to a purchaser
is not a mandatory concept but subject to the discretion of the court which
discretion was exercised and properly so and which exercise of discretion
cannot be overturned by the Supreme Court, or should not be overturned by the
SUprene Court without a clear and unequivical showing of an abuse of
discretion by the trial court.

Reviewing this second portion of point 1

first, the Respondent further argues that the Appellant bears the burden of
proof in establishing a clear and unequivical abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court which the Appellant has failed to sustain.
The Appellant argues with regards to the first concept covered under
point 1 that this is in fact not strictly a specific performance case in that
the Appellant has sought and obtained f ran the trial court relief f ran strict
adhearence to the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties
since the Appellant has sought and obtained an extension of considerable
duration for the payment of the majority of the equity the Seller-Respondent
in this case was to have obtained for the sale of the real property in
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question.

Specific performance requires both parties to strictly adhere to

the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties and in this case
the Appellant has sought the strict performance by the Respondent and has
sought to avoid strict performance thanselves.
The case argued in the brief of the Appellant asserts an entitlement to
damages and the Respondent admits that in certain circumstances damages are
available and should be granted to successful litigants in specific
performance cases for the fair rental value of the property during the
pendency of the litigation prior to the close and taking of possessory
interest of the subject real property.

The Respondent hCMever asserts that

in this case the court chose to avoid the harsh effect of those damages for

the benefit of the Respondent and chose to avoid the harsh effect of
requiring strict perfonnance of the payment of the majority of the money
required under the terms of the contract for the benefit of the Appellant.
The argtnnent

I

have made that the trial court has broad discretionary

authority in detennination of the propriety of judgments and the structuring
of judgments is evidenced by cases covering a broad spectrum of topics and
concepts each evidencing the nature of the course of discretion in the
granting of judgments, the denying of judgments and the modification of
judgments.

In our case, the Appellant seeks to have the Suprene Court review

the judgment entered by Judge Croft even after the Appellant has sought an
order modifying said judgment originally and after Judge Croft has had an
opportunity of hearing the evidence presented at the time of trial, the
arguments presented by counsel and the secondary arguments presented by
counsel in the motion to modify the judgment of the court. Judge Croft• s
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exercise Of discretion in not granting damages for rentals on the subject
property is a detriment to the Appellant admittedly but nevertheless
a valid exercise Of discretion and judgmental authority by the tryer of fact.
Judge Croft's decision to enforce this specific terms and conditions of the
contract as contained in the order of the court except for the provision
pertaining to the "balloon payment" and allowing the "balloon payment" to be
made two (2) years after the date of closing is again an evidence of the act
of discretion and authority property within the relm and control of the tryer
of fact and in this case was exercised to the detriment of the Respondent.
If specific performance is mandated strictly, Judge Croft would have been

charged with the responsibility of requiring payment of the balloon payment
in May of 1982, giving rise to the ci>ligation of the p..irchaser to cane

foIWard with the $32,000.00 plus required of them within a few short months
after the entry of the judgment and yet Judge Croft sought to modify the
harshness of this requirenent by interpreting his authority to grant him the
leway to modify the specific performance of the contract to that extent while
requiring of the Respondent-Seller in this case, the requirement of
nevertheless selling the property and relinquishing title and possessory
interest.

Judge Croft, as the tryer of fact, obviously weighed the benefits

and burdens, the equities and provisions of law governing the issue of strict
performance of the contract terms and entitlement of fair rental values for
the successful litigant and made the detennination as to the appropriate
award which the Appellant is now contesting again even though the Appellant
received the substantial benefit of the delay of payments available under
this use of discretion.

For a series of cases evidencing the wide range of
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discretionary authority available the trial judge the Respondent refers the
court to the cases of Mayer-·=v··-Mayer,- 492 P. 2nd 942, a 1972 Supreme Court
case fran the State of Kansas, and McNeill-v1···-M-len, 534 P. 2nd 813, a 1975
Appeals court case fran the State of Colorado, and Reese--v,-·::;Geiermann;- 574 P.
2nd 445, a supreme court case fran the State of Alaska handed down in 1978,
and Hume::v•--Small:Claims=·=eourt--of::Mttrra;y:€ity;- 590 P. 2nd 309, a 1979 Supreme
Court, a decision fran the State of Utah, all of which evidence in various
means and capacities the nature of the broad spectrum of discretionary
authority in the rendering of judgments and the granting of judgments and
decisions available to trial courts.

All of which sustain the basis

proposition that the trial court has the authority to weigh the evidence and
make a detennination based upon law and equity as to the appropriate judgment
and/or decision to be rendered.

Further it is the contention of the Appellant that there has been
established a fair rental value of the property at $265.00 per month.

The

Appellant has asserted in its brief that the Respondent rented the property
for a period of time and testified as to the rental value.

The Appellant

further asserts that no factual or legal issue exists or is in dispute
pertaining thereto, but it is the position of the Respondent that in deed in
factual and legal questions to exist as to the fair rental value, the acts
engaged in by the Respondent and the necessity of the court awarding damages
as opposed to the courts discretionary authortity to award damages for the
fair rental value of the property pending the performance by specific decree
of the court ordering the same.

The Respondent asserts that the Respondent
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_Q_

did not in fact rent the property out but that an agent of a real estate
canpany whos agency had been prior thereto revoked by the Respondent took it
upon herself and rented the property during the pendency of this litigation
and with regards to the $265.00 figure that was the figure that the agent,
after having had the agency's authority revoked, charged for the property
and had nothing to do with the Respondent's charges for the property or
expert testimony pertaining to or even qualified testimony pertaining to the
fair rental value of the property.

It is the position of the Respondent that

the fair rental value of the property has not been established and that Judge
Croft during the course of the proceedings, determined that all parties would
be placed in the best interest by decreeing specific performance on the

contract subject to the modification allowing the Appellant two (2) additional
years for all intents and purposes in which to pay off the balloon payment
required and not awarding the Appellant-Plaintiff in the above-entitled
matter any damages for the fair rental value on the property during the
pendency of the litigation.

In the case decided by the Utah supreme Court

entitled Nuttall v. Holman, 173 P. 2nd 1015, the court determined that
damages for the deprevation of use or the loss of use or rental values could
not be sustained on the courts individual indulgence and speculation and
conjtmcture as to the proper values and amounts of damages, losses or
analagusly, rental receipts.
It is further the :E:X>Sition of the Respondent that should the supreme
Court in this review process determine that the laver court has errored in
the matter of granting damages for the fair rental value of the property
pending the enforcement of the specific perf onnance of the contract that the
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SUprane Court should charge the trial court with the obligation of requiring
a specific performance according to a strict reading of the terms and
conditions of the existing contract including the requirement of,
specifically, the payment of the balloon payment required thereunder in May
of 1982 on that given date as opposed to the granting of a two (2) year tenn
following the closing as is the existing order for the record appears to
provide an indication that Judge Croft's determination was that there was an
appropriate off set and justice would be better served by not granting rental
damages and by granting a delay for Appellant-Plaintiff's strict performance
as to the payment of the balloon required under the subject contract.

CONCLUSION

In

conclusion, the Respondent asserts that the trial court has not

abused its discretion in not granting damages for the rental value of the
property pending the closing of the sale and that the trial court exercised
its appropriate discretion in offsetting this potential relief available to
the Plaintiff-Appellant, by granting the Plaintiff-Appellant the opportunity
to avoid the payment of a balloon payment required in May of 1982 setting
that balloon payment aside for two (2) years follCMing the date of closing of
the transaction.

It is the position of the Respondent that a trial court has

abroad and effective range of discretion which the Supreme Court should not
overturn unless a clear and discernable abuse of discretion has been
established which clear and discernable abuse of discretion has not been
established by the Appellant.
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